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Critical Assessment of Wave-Particle Complementarity
via Derivation from Quantum Mechanics
Fedor Herbut
Abstract After introducing sketchily Bohr’s wave-particle complementarity
principle in his own words, a derivation of an extended form of the principle
from standard quantum mechanics is performed. Reality-content evaluation
of each step is given. The derived theory is applied to simple examples and
the extended entities are illustrated in a thought experiment. Assessment
of the approach of Bohr and of this article is taken up again with a rather
negative conclusion as far as reflecting reality is concerned. The paper ends
with quotations of selected incisive opinions on Bohr’s dogmatic attitude and
with some comments by the present author.
Keywords Copenhagen interpretation, quantum-mechanical insight in ex-
periments, search of quantum-mechanical reality
1 Introduction
Recent investigation [1], [2], [3], has shown that the relative-reality-of-
wave-function point of view gives good insight in some intricate experi-
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ments. This may come as a surprise in view of the well-known fact that
for a very long time Bohr and Copenhagen reigned the field. One of the
leading ideas was Bohr’s wave-particle complementarity (or duality) princi-
ple. This investigation is aimed at a critical derivation of it, or rather of its
natural extension, from quantum mechanics, and at an appraisal from the
point of view of the reality-of-state approach. A precise criterion will emerge
distinguishing Bohr’s case from the extension.
To begin with, one should remember the often quoted commentary of
Einstein [4]:
Quote EINSTEIN: ”... Bohr’s principle of complementarity,
the sharp formulation of which, moreover, I have been unable
to achieve despite much effort which I have expended on it.”
(Emphasis by F. H.)
Complementarity, in contrast to indeterminacy, seems to have remained
unsettled between Einstein and Bohr.
There were other disquieting events concerning complementarity. As early
as in 1951 a no lesser physicist than Max Born expressed doubts in one of
his books [5]:
Quote BORN: ”The conceptions ”particles” and ”waves” have
no such complementary character (he means Bohr’s ’mutual ex-
clusion’ of the corresponding experiments, F. H.), as in many
cases both are needed ...”
Further, there is the paradox (with respect to Bohr’s wave-particle com-
plementarity principle) of Ghose and Home [6] in a real experiment. This
important work, and some other thought experiments [7], [8] indicate that
2
Bohr’s intuitive complementarity principle was too narrowly conceived. It
may be that in Bohr’s time one did not think of sophisticated experiments;
the simple ones seemed quite baffling.
It is well known that the formal structure of quantum mechanics has
had unparalleled success in predicting probabilities of measurement results
in microscopic phenomena. Not one prediction of the former was proved false
in the latter.
In an attempt to derive a sharp form of wave-particle duality, we will deal
with experiments in which an observable with a purely discrete spectrum is
exactly measured. In other words, experiments with positive-operator-valued
measures (POVM) and inexact (or unsharp) measurements are outside the
scope of this study.
We start by a glance at Bohr’s idea of the duality in question.
2 On Bohr’s Wave-Particle Complementarity
Principle
I’ll present what I think is the most important part of Bohr’s complementar-
ity principle in four quotes of Bohr’s own words. In the first [9], Bohr explains
what the problem is in the example of the well-known Mach-Zehnder inter-
ferometer [10] (cf the upper part of the Figure in subsection 9.1).
Quote BOHR1: ”The extent to which renunciation of the visu-
alization of atomic phenomena is imposed upon us by the impossi-
bility of their subdivision is strikingly illustrated by the following
example to which Einstein very early called attention and often
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has reverted. If a semi-reflecting mirror is placed in the way of
a photon, having two possibilities for its direction of propaga-
tion, the photon may either be recorded on one, and only one,
of two photographic plates situated at great distances in the two
directions in question, or else we may, by replacing the plates
by mirrors, observe effects exhibiting an interference between the
two reflected wave-trains. In any attempt at a pictorial represen-
tation of the behavior of the photon we would, thus, meet with
the difficulty: to be obliged to say on the one hand, that the pho-
ton always chooses one of the two ways and, on the other hand,
that it behaves as if it had passed both ways.” (Emphasis by F.
H.)
In the next quote [11] Bohr expounds his answer to the ”difficulty”, in
terms of his famous principle of complementarity:
Quote BOHR2: ”Information regarding the behavior of an
atomic object obtained under definite experimental conditions
may, however, according to a terminology often used in atomic
physics, be adequately characterized as complementary to any
information about the same object obtained by some other ex-
perimental arrangement excluding the fulfillment of the first con-
ditions. Although such kinds of information cannot be combined
into a single picture by means of ordinary concepts (i. e., by as-
suming that the descriptive terms in the complementary descrip-
tions refer to ”the same object”), they represent indeed equally
essential aspects of any knowledge on the object in question which
can be obtained from this domain.” (Emphasis by F. H.)
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Another quote [12] sums up complementarity in a less bulky way:
Quote BOHR3: ”...evidence obtained under different experi-
mental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture,
but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only
the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information
about the objects.”
In application to the Mach-Zehnder ’difficulty’ (see Quote BOHR1), the
complementarity principle treats the which-path and the interference versions
(described in Quote BOHR1) as two complementary experiments. Hence, the
’visualizations’ or ’pictorial representations’ in them cannot be combined. In
such a manner Bohr solves the mentioned mind-boggling perplexity. This
is so even in Wheeler’s well-known delayed-choice version [13], in which the
choice between ’which-path’ or ’interference’ is made after the photon has
passed the semi-reflecting mirror. This is clear from the immediate continu-
ation of quote BOHR1:
Quote BOHR4: ”It is just arguments of this kind which re-
call the impossibility of subdividing quantum phenomena and re-
veal the ambiguity in ascribing customary physical attributes to
atomic objects.” (Emphasis by F. H.)
In my understanding, by ’subdivisions’ (cf also quote BOHR1) Bohr
means both spatial and temporal ones.
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3 Introduction into Visualization Theory
As well known, Bohr applied classical physics to the behavior of the macro-
scopic measuring agency that measures some observable A at the final
moment tf of some experiment. But he did more than that. He pushed
description in terms of classical physics also into an answer to the ques-
tion ’What happens in the experiment?’. As we saw in Quotes BOHR2 and
BOHR3, he called this ’visualization’ or ’pictorial representation’. One won-
ders why he did go so far with classical description. Perhaps, we can find an
answer in the following quote [14].
Quote BOHR5: ”The language of Newton and Maxwell will
remain the language of physicists for all time” (Emphasis by F.
H.)
For a thorough discussion of this point see Schlosshauer [15].
Reichenbach has pointed out that three-valued logic is more in the spirit
of quantum mechanics than the standard two-valued one [16]. But we do
think in terms of two-valued logic. Perhaps for this reason, three-valued
logic did not find much application in quantum mechanics or its philosophy.
It seems to me that Bohr believed that the situation is similar with physics.
According to him, apparently, we cannot help viewing the world around us
in terms of classical physics. This is one of the reasons, perhaps why Bohr
strived to pervade quantum mechanics with classical physics as much as pos-
sible.
Some prerequisites for a theory are now going to be presented. They
are meant to be the basis of a derived sharp form of the complementarity
principle.
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Let us consider a quantum experiment. It begins, at an initial moment
ti, with a prepared spatial ensemble of quantum systems, or with a single
individual system from the, experimentally and theoretically identical, time
ensemble. Both the ensemble and each individual system in it are described
by some density operator ρ(ti) (mostly by the special case of a state vector
or wave function - as often said). The elements of the ensemble are assumed
to be non-interacting with each other and with the environment. Thus, due to
dynamical isolation, one has evolution with a unitary operator U(tf−ti, ti)
in the Schro¨dinger picture. Throughout this paper, we shall omit the moment
when the operator is applied. It will be understood that it is at the earlier
of the two moments defining the time interval of evolution. Thus,
ρ(tf ) = U(tf − ti)ρ(ti)U(tf − ti)†, (1)
where the dagger denotes adjoining (and, in this case, adjoint equals inverse).
As it has been stated, it is assumed that we have exact measurement
of an ordinary, complete or incomplete, observable with a purely discrete
spectrum at the final moment tf . Let A be the Hermitian operator
representing it in the formalism, and let its spectral form be
A =
∑
n
anPn, n 6= n′ ⇒ an 6= an′ . (2a)
(The index or quantum number n enumerates the distinct eigenvalues an
and eigen-projectors Pn. ) The accompanying spectral decomposition of the
identity is ∑
n
Pn = I, (2b)
where I denotes the identity operator. Relation (2b) is also called the
relation of completeness and also the closure property. The sum in (2b) has
at most a countable infinity of orthogonal projector terms.
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In many experiments, the completeness relation (2b) makes the spectral
form (2a) superfluous, i. e., one talks in terms of eigen-events Pn without
eigenvalues an.
As it is well known, the measuring apparatus detects a result an (cf
(2a)) or, more generally put, the occurrence of an eigen-event Pn , in the
state ρ(tf ) for each individual system. As to the ensemble, the observed
relative frequency of the result is close to the predicted probability value,
given by the so-called trace formula (the up-to-date equivalent of Born’s
rule)
pn = tr
(
Pnρ(tf )
)
. (3)
(One should obtain equality in the limes of an imagined infinitely large en-
semble.)
We give now a formal definition of the retrospective observables Ar(t) ,
ti ≤ t < tf , the Hermitian-operator representatives of which have the spec-
tral forms:
Ar(t) ≡∑
n
anP
r
n(t), n 6= n′ ⇒ an 6= an′ , (4a)
with the definition of retrospectivity at the moment t :
∀n : P rn(t) ≡ U †(tf − t)PnU(tf − t). (4b)
(It may be sometimes suitable to allow the eigenvalues of Ar(t), if they
have a physical meaning, not to be necessarily equal to those of A because
it is the projectors that count.) Naturally, (2b) implies the completeness
relation ∑
n
P rn(t) = I. (4c)
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Besides the actually measured observable A and its formal images
Ar(t) , which are ’back-evolved’ to a moment t , let also new observables
B(t) , ’jokers’ for the time being, be introduced. They will play a natural
role in completing the forthcoming derivation.
Let also the observables B(t) be defined in spectral form
B(t) =
∑
k
bkQk(t), k 6= k′ ⇒ bk 6= bk′ , (5a)
with the completeness relation ∑
k
Qk(t) = I (5b)
for the eigen-projectors. We consider B(t) as given at the initial or some
intermediate moment t.
It will also be useful to formally evolve B to the final moment tf
when the actual measurement of A takes place. One has
Bf ≡ U(tf − t)B(t)U(tf − t)†, (6a)
∀k : Qfk = U(tf − t)Qk(t)U(tf − t)† (6b)
(cf the convention adopted above (1)).
One should remember that it is the Schro¨dinger picture that is being
made use of. The evolution (or ’back evolution’) of an observable are auxil-
iary concepts (nothing to do with the Heisenberg dynamical picture).
4 Blindness to Coherence in Measurement
Let us return to the actually measured observable A in the final state
ρ(tf ) , and let us define the coherence-deprived mixture
ρ(tf )M ≡
∑
n
pnρ(tf )
n
M (7a)
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corresponding to A , where the (statistical) weights are the probabilities
pn given by (3), and
∀n, pn > 0 : ρ(tf )nM ≡ Pnρ(tf )Pn
/
pn (7b)
are the constituent states of which the mixture consists (concerning n , cf
(2a)). One should note that if pn = 0, then, as it is usually understood, the
entire corresponding term in (7a) is zero - in spite of the fact that the corre-
sponding density operator (7b) is not defined. (This will not be mentioned
again for other formal mixtures below.)
In each state defined by (7b) the observable A has the definite corre-
sponding value an . This is so because tr
(
Pnρ(tf )
n
M
)
= tr
(
ρ(tf )
n
M
)
= 1 .
It is possible coherence that makes a difference between a given state
ρ(tf ) and the corresponding mixture (7a). It is important to be aware that
’coherence’ is a relative concept that applies to a state in relation to an
observable (for more details see [17]). In this case we have possible coherence
in ρ(tf ) in relation to A .
In view of the fact that one can always write ρ =
∑
k
∑
k′ QkρQk′ (cf the
completeness relation (5b)), one can, in general, define coherence as follows.
Definition 1. A state ρ is coherent with respect to an observable B if∑
k 6=k′ QkρQk′ 6= 0 (cf (5a)), or, equivalently, if ∃k 6= k′ : QkρQk′ 6= 0.
In (7a) the state is by ’brute force’ deprived of all possible coherence
among the distinct values of A in ρ(tf ) =
∑
n,n′ Pnρ(tf )Pn′ . (As to a
measure for the amount of coherence, see [17].) This is why Bell calls (7a)
the ’butchered’ version of ρ(tf ) [18].
It is a crucial fact that, in spite of the ’butchering’, one obtains the
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same individual-system results and the same relative frequencies
when A is measured in ρ(tf ) or in ρ(tf )M (cf (7a)). Thus, the mea-
suring apparatus cannot distinguish the final state ρ(tf ) from the corre-
sponding ’butchered’ mixture (7a) in the given experiment , i. e., it is blind
to the possible coherence in ρ(tf ).
Next, let us define the mixture corresponding to the initial or intermediate
state ρ(t) ≡ U(t− ti)ρ(ti)U(t− ti)† , ti ≤ t < tf , and the corresponding
retrospective observable Ar(t) (cf (4a) and (4b)). But first let us establish
(by inserting the evolution operator) that the initial or intermediate and the
final probabilities are equal:
∀n : tr
(
P rn(t)ρ(t)
)
= tr
[(
U(tf−t)†PnU(tf−t)
)(
U(tf−t)†ρ(tf )U(tf−t)
)]
=
tr
(
Pnρ(tf )
)
= pn
(cf (1), (3) and (6a)).
The ’butchered’ mixture that we want to write down is:
ρ(t)M ≡
∑
n
pnρ(t)
n
M , (8a)
where
∀n, pn > 0 : ρ(t)nM ≡ P rn(t)ρ(t)P rn(t)
/
pn (8b)
(cf (4b)).
The unitary evolution by U(tf − t) takes the initial or intermediate
mixture (8a) into the final mixture (7a). Therefore, in the given experiment
the state ρ(t) and the corresponding ’butchered’ mixture ρ(t)M in re-
lation to Ar(t), cannot be distinguished neither on the individual-system
level, nor as ensembles.
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5 The ’Simplest Which-Result’ Visualization
Theory
The retrospective observable Ar(t) (cf (4a)) is, in general, just a mathe-
matical construction. But in some experiments it has a physical meaning.
Then we have the ’simplest which-result’ visualization. It is slightly more
general than the case of Bohr’s particle-like visualization (see below).
The visualization at issue consists of two drastic imagined steps of
changes.
(i) Whereas the true initial or intermediate state ρ(t), which, in gen-
eral, contains coherence in relation to Ar(t) , describes both a laboratory
ensemble and each individual system in it, in the visualization it is the
’butchered’ mixture ρ(t)M (cf (8a)) without the possible coherence that
describes the ensemble.
(ii) Resorting to the so-called ’ignorance-interpretation’ of a mixture used
in classical physics, the individual system is described by one of the
constituent states ρ(t)nM in the mixture (cf (8b)).
In visualization, the ensemble state ρ(t)M , given by (8a), is a mixture
of the individual-system states states given by (8b).
It is important to keep in mind that the state (8b) has the definite property
an of the retrospective observable A
r(t) (cf (4a-c)), or, equivalently, that
the eigen-event P rn(t) of A
r(t) occurs in it.
The ’simplest which-result’ visualization, which is being expounded, is
based on the following relations, which are easily seen to follow from the
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definitions (4a) and (4b):
Ar(t) ≡ U(t−ti)Ar(ti)U(t−ti)† =
∑
n
anU(t−ti)P rn(ti)U(t−ti)† =
∑
n
anP
r(t)
(9a)
(cf (4a) and (4b)), and
∀n, pn > 0 : ρ(t)nM = U(t− ti)ρ(ti)nMU(t− ti)† =
U(t− ti)
(
P rn(ti)ρ(ti)P
r
n(ti)
/
pn
)
U(t− ti)† =(
U(t−ti)P rn(ti)U(t−ti)†
)(
U(t−ti)ρ(ti)U(t−ti)†
/
pn
)(
U(t−ti)P rn(ti)U(t−ti)†
)
=
P rn(t)ρ(t)P
r
n(t)
/
pn, (9b)
where ti ≤ t ≤ tf , and Ar(tf ) = A . Thus, the individual system is at
each instant t imagined to be in a state ρ(t)nM , which has the definite
value an of A
r(t) .
In most cases A and all its ’back-evolved’ forms Ar(t) are localization
observables. Then, one speaks of ’which way’ instead of ’which result’, and
one imagines that the system behaves as a particle moving along a trajec-
tory (particle-like behavior). If, in addition, the initial observable Ar(ti)
has the physical meaning of localization, i. e., if the quantum-mechanical
’trajectory’ begins at the initial moment, then one has Bohr’s particle-like
behavior in the famous wave-particle duality relevant for a large number of
experiments.
6 A More Practical Criterion
Remark 1 It is easy to see that in the ’simplest which-result’ case that
we consider, Ar(ti) satisfies the assumptions of premeasurement ([19] and
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[20]): Ar(ti) appears to be the measured observable, A the ’pointer
observable’, and the macroscopic (classically described) measuring agency
appears to play the role of objectification (or ’reading’ the result).
It is not always easy to evaluate the action of the formal back-evolving op-
erator U(tf − t)† on the measured observable A . Hence a more practical
criterion is desirable.
We resort to the ’joker’ observable B (cf (5a)), and make use of it
having in mind that ’simplest which-result’ visualization consists in the fact
that there exists an observable B with physical meaning and the equality
B = Ar(t) holds true.
Theorem 1 A necessary and sufficient condition for a ’which-result’ visu-
alization: If an observable B(t) , ti ≤ t < tf , has physical meaning and,
having in mind the quantum numbers of B(t) and A (cf (5a) and (2a) re-
spectively), there exists a bijection (a one-to-one ’onto’ map) k → n = n(k)
such that for each value of the index k, whenever a state ρ(t) has the
property bk, or, equivalently, the event Qk occurs in ρ(t), then the
final state ρ(tf ) gives the result an(k) in the measurement of A with
certainty, i. e.,
tr
(
ρ(t)Qk(t)
)
= 1 ⇒ tr
(
ρ(tf )Pn(k)
)
= 1. (10)
If the condition is valid, then B(t) = Ar(t) , and one has ’which-result’
visualization.
Proof is given in Appendix A.
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Remark 2 Theorem 1 implies that the retrospective observable Ar(t) , and
no other observable (up to the eigenvalues an , which are irrelevant), has the
required property. The property itself can be experimentally demonstrated
(see the examples below) by showing that any initial state with any definite
value bk of a given observable B with a physical meaning necessarily
ends up in a state with the definite value an(k) of the actually measured
observable A. If the ’which-result’ experiment is understood as measure-
ment of Ar(ti) via the ’pointer observable’ A (cf Remark 1), then the
theorem says that the latter measures precisely one observable (up to arbi-
trary eigenvalues).
Incidentally, I have discussed backward ’projection’ in time of an actually
measured observable in two previous articles in contexts different from the
present one [20], [21].
7 Completion of the ’Interference’ or ’Which-
Result’ Visualization
Remark 3 To develop a full visualization theory, one needs to answer two
questions:
(i) Can one have a ’which-result’ experiment without one of the retro-
spective observables Ar(t) being physically meaningful?
(ii) If one does not have a ’which-result’ experiment, does one ipso facto
have a wave-like or ’interference’ pictorial representation?
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To answer the two questions in Remark 3, we turn to the other alternative
in Bohr’s wave-particle complementarity principle: to the wave.
Classical waves are essentially different from quantum-mechanical wave-
like behavior, which is universal and contained in the very time evolution (1)
of any quantum-mechanical state ρ(ti). Let us take as a simple example
diffraction of a photon through one hole. (This case puzzled Einstein in
Solvey 1927 [22].)
On passing the hole, the evolution of the photon can be understood in
a simplified, coarse-grained way as consisting of a diverging coherent bundle
of component probability amplitudes constituting a half-sphere. When the
photon is located, one of the components is realized, and all the others just
disappear, become mysteriously extinguished. (This is the collapse version
of quantum-mechanical insight.)
Locating a photon in a dot out of a half-sphere is only quantitatively (not
qualitatively) different from the case of the Mach-Zehnder which-way device.
(In the latter only one component is extinguished.)
Returning to classical wave-like behavior, here we have components that
are real in the classical sense. Their reality is detectable: all components
simultaneously influence the result of measurement (or measurements). This
idea leads us to the basic Definition 3 below, which distinguishes ’which-
result’ experiments from ’interference’ ones.
Coherence (see Definition 1) is usually detected as interference. Let
B (cf (5a)) be an observable that has physical meaning at some moment
t, ti ≤ t ≤ tf in the experiment.
Definition 2 A state ρ(t) exhibits interference in relation to an observ-
16
able B in the measurement of an observable A (cf (2a)) if for at least
one eigenvalue an of A the state ρ(t) predicts a different probability
than the ’butchered’ mixture corresponding to B :
ρ(t)M,B ≡
∑
k
pkρ(t)
k
M,B , (11a)
where the statistical weights are
∀k : pk ≡ tr(Qkρ(t)) (11b)
(cf (5a)), and the definite-result states of B are
∀k, pk > 0 : ρ(t)kM,B ≡ Qkρ(t)Qk
/
pk. (11c)
In Definition 2 ”predicts” is short for ”the corresponding time-evolved
state ρ(tf ) predicts”. Thus, on the one hand we have tr
(
ρ(tf )Pn
)
(cf
(2a)) with ρ(tf ) = U(tf − t))ρ(t)U(tf − t))† . On the other hand, we have
tr
[(
U(tf − t))ρ(t)M,BU(tf − t))†
)
Pn
]
. Interference has set in if these two
probabilities differ for at least one value of n.
Definition 3 A) We say that an observable B (cf (5a)) with a physical
meaning at some moment t, ti ≤ t ≤ tf , is a ’which-result’ observ-
able in the given experiment that ends in the measurement of A, and
the experiment is a ’which-result’ one in relation to B , if the final state
ρ(tf ) exhibits no interference in comparison with the corresponding mixture
U(tf − t)ρ(t)M,BU(tf − t)† (cf Definition 2)).
B) We say that an observable B with a physical meaning at a mo-
ment t is an ’interference’ one, and the experiment is an ’interference’
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one in relation to B if there exists at least one physically meaningful
initial state ρ(ti) that shows interference with respect to B in the mea-
surement of A . (Needless to say that this ρ(ti) then must a fortiori
contain coherence with respect to B .)
The first question in Remark 3 is now going to be answered by deriving a
necessary and sufficient condition for ’which-result’ visualization. The con-
dition will simultaneously answer also the second question in the affirmative.
Theorem 2 ’Interference’ or ’which-result’ visualization Let B(t) be a
physically meaningful observable at some moment t, ti ≤ t < tf in the
given experiment.
A) The observable B(t) is a ’which-result’ one and the experiment
is of the same kind in relation to B if and only if its evolved form Bf ≡
B(tf ) (cf (6a)) and A are compatible, i. e., they commute as operators
[
Bf , A
]
= 0. (12)
In more detail, any initial state ρ(ti) and the corresponding ’butchered’
state ρ(ti)M,B (cf (11a-c)) predict the same probability for every value an
of the actually measured observable A if and only if (12) is valid.
B) If B(t) is not a ’which-result’ observable, then ipso facto B(t)
and the experiment in relation to it are ’interference’ ones. More precisely,
in this case there exists, in principle, a physically meaningful initial state
ρ(ti) such that it ’predicts’ at least for one result Pn of A a different
probability than the corresponding ’butchered’ mixture ρ(t)M,B .
Proof is given in Appendix B.
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Remark 4 One should note the relative character of a ’which-result’ or ’in-
terference’ experiment. But one can say, in the spirit of Bohr’s wave-particle
complementarity principle, if there exists at least one physically meaningful
observable B at some instant t , ti ≤ t ≤ tf in relation to which the
experiment is a ’which-result one’, then the experiment can be viewed as
such in an absolute sense.
Remark 5 A physically meaningful observable B that is not the back-
evolved measured observable A is most useful when to each eigenvalue
an of A corresponds one eigenvalue bk of B (more precisely, each
range of Pn , cf (2a), is part of one range of some Q
f
k , cf (12)). But one
and the same bk should corresponds to more than one an , or else B is
as good as A itself (then the Qk and Pn coincide), and B is actually
the back-evolved A.
Remark 6 If a physically meaningful observable B has more than two
eigenvalues, then it has nontrivial functions as new observables. Then, it
may happen that the experiment has a different character (’interference’ or
’which-result’ one) for B and for one of its functions.
Remark 7 One should notice that, by definition, we have the ’interference’
alternative if there exists at least one initial state ρ(ti), possessing coher-
ence with respect to the considered physically meaningful observable B,
that is detectable as interference (see Definition 3). If B is an ’interfer-
ence’ observable, there still may be initial states for which the ’which-result’
visualization is applicable.
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One can see this, e. g., in some quantum erasure experiments. See the
beautiful real (random delayed-choice) experiment in [23]. The photon en-
tering the Young two-slit experiment (the ’second’ one) has another photon
(the ’first’ one) correlated to it moving in the opposite direction. By suitable
measurements on the latter, the ensemble of all ’second’ photons is broken
up into two subensembles (improper mixture of two states), one giving an
’interference’ experiment, and the other being a ’which-way’ one.
8 Simple Examples of Visualizations
The visualization theory presented in sections 3-7 is now going to be illus-
trated on four simple and well-known examples, all belonging to the binary
case, i. e., to the case when the measured observable A has only two values.
8.1 Mach-Zehnder
Imagining the propagation of the photon through the Mach-Zehnder inter-
fering device [10] (cf the upper part of the Figure in subsection 9.1), it tra-
verses the first and the second beam splitter (’semi-reflecting mirrors’ in
quote BOHR1).
To understand the two complementary experiments to be described,
one should have in mind that the first beam splitter can be in place, can
be removed, and can be replaced by a totally-reflecting mirror in the same
position. When it is in place, besides being at the standard angle 450, it
can be at any angle 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1800 . Thus, it plays the role of a preparator.
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The photon leaves the preparator at the initial instant ti.
If the second beam splitter is removed, we have the Mach-Zehnder
which-way device, and in it one of the two experiments, which we call the
which-way one - a special case of a which-result experiment. If the second
beam splitter is in place, we have the Mach-Zehnder interference device,
and in it the complementary experiment, which we call the interference ex-
periment. At the final instant tf , the photon leaves the place of the second
beam splitter (or the beam splitter itself if it is in place) to enter one of the
detectors. Detection at one or the other of the detectors means occurrence
of the eigen-events P1 or P2 of the measured localization observable A
(cf (2a)). (The eigenvalues an are arbitrary and irrelevant. The results are,
this time, expressed in terms of the localization eigen-events Pi, i = 1, 2. )
In the which-way experiment the eigen-events Q1 ≡ Qh (horizontal
propagation) and Q2 ≡ Qv (vertical propagation) of the physically mean-
ingful observable B (cf (5a)), which occur in the preparator, this time
coincide with those of the retrospective observable Ar(ti) (cf (4a)) mutatis
mutandis.
Namely, the event Qh takes place if the first beam splitter is removed
and the photon propagates horizontally. The event Qv occurs if the first
beam splitter is replaced by an equally positioned mirror. Then the photon
is reflected and it propagates vertically. Since, by definition of the experi-
ment, the second beam splitter is removed, it is obvious that the condition
of Theorem 1 is satisfied.
Therefore, if the first beam splitter is in place at some mentioned angle,
and we have a coherent initial state
|φ, ti〉 ≡ α |φ〉h + β |φ〉v, (13a)
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where | φ〉h is a pure state propagating horizontally, and | φ〉v is one
propagating vertically, and
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1, α 6= 0 6= β, (13b)
then the experiment cannot distinguish it from the (incoherent) mixture
|α|2 |φ〉h〈φ |h +|β|2 |φ〉v〈φ |v . (14)
This implies the which-way visualization.
Simply put: in spite of the first beam splitter being in place (under some
angle), and coherence existing in the initial state, the photon appears to have
left the first beam splitter either horizontally or vertically (not both at the
same time). This is a ’pictorial representation’ (to use Bohr’s term, cf quote
BOHR1) along classical space-time lines.
We are dealing here perhaps with the most simple case of Bohr’s particle-
like behavior.
Incidentally, one sometimes uses the expression ”the photon has which-
path information”. I think, this is thoroughly misleading because it suggests
that ’going one path’ for a single photon is a real event in nature. But it isn’t.
In the ’interference’ experiment the second beam splitter is in place.
The actually measured observable A and the physically meaningful observ-
able B, or rather its eigen-events Qh, Qv (in the preparator) are defined
as in the described complementary ’which-way’ experiment. But this time, as
easily seen, the condition of Theorem 1 is not satisfied, and the retrospective
observable Ar(ti) is not equal to B. The former observable has no physical
meaning.
Resorting to Theorem 2, it is not easy to see if Bf and A commute or
not. It is easier to utilize the very definition of ’interference’ experiments (cf
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Definition 2). Thus, it is obvious that Qh and Qv contribute coherently
to the two detection rates and one has interference.
In this case there is no visualization or classical space-time picture in
terms of a one-way motion. One does speak, instead, of the photon taking
both paths simultaneously in spite of the coherent initial state (13a), but
this is only putting in words the quantum-mechanical evolution (cf (1)).
It is important and satisfying to know that both single-photon Mach-
Zehnder experiments discussed are no longer in the realm of thought experi-
ments; they have become real experiments performed in a convincing way in
the laboratory [24].
8.2 Two Slits
To apply the visualization theory from sections 3-7 to this case, we take
the more sophisticated Wheeler’s delayed-choice version [25]. The photon
that has passed the slits goes through lenses that make the separate one-slit
paths cross at, what we call, the ’close distance’, and afterwards diverge,
so that at a ’farther distance’ there is no possibility of interference. If one
puts detectors at suitable places there, at the ’farther distance’, they detect
precisely the photon from one or the other of the slits. We add to this
independently movable shutters on the slits for our purposes. Thus, the
which-way experiment is defined.
The measured observable A is the detection of localization at the ’far-
ther distance’. The physically meaningful observable B is, as easily seen,
’going through the one or through the other slit’. The condition of Theorem
1 is, obviously, satisfied, B = Ar(ti) , and we have which-way visualiza-
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tion, in particular, Bohr’s particle-like behavior.
In the interference experiment the photons never reach the detectors
from the preceding complementary experiment because a second screen with
detectors (or a film plate) is raised at the ’close distance’, where interference
takes place. The actually measured observable A is again localization,
and the physically meaningful observable B is the same as in the above
complementary experiment. The retrospective observable Ar(ti) is now a
complicated mathematical construction devoid of physical meaning because
the condition in Theorem 1 is not satisfied. Hence, there is no ’which-way’
visualization.
One speaks of the photon going through both slits, but this is only putting
in words what the evolution operator in the quantum-mechanical formalism
does.
8.3 Stern-Gerlach
In the Stern Gerlach spin-projection measurement of a spin-one-half particle,
complementarity comes from different axis orientations. But for any given
orientation, the experiment allows visualization. The measured observable
A is defined by the dots on the screen. (It is again a localization mea-
surement as in the preceding cases.) The retrospective observable Ar(ti)
is determined by definite spin-up and definite spin-down before entering the
magnetic field. As easily seen, the condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied and
we have ’which-result’ visualization though it is not of a space-time nature.
It consists in saying that the particle has a definite spin-projection (up or
down), not both, throughout the experiment.
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8.4 Double Stern-Gerlach
Let us imagine a modified Stern-Gerlach device measuring the z-projection
of a spin-one-half particle, but without the screen (on which the dots should
appear). Instead, the particle just leaves in the upper or in the lower half-
space entering one of two suitably placed second Stern-Gerlach devices the
upper one measuring the x-projection of spin, and the lower one the y-
projection (both supplied with screens giving the dots).
It is intuitively obvious that, whatever the coherent state entering the first
(modified) Stern-Gerlach device, if one obtains, e. g., an upper dot in the
upper second Stern-Gerlach device, the particle must have passed through
the upper half-space in the first Stern-Gerlach (otherwise it would not have
reached the upper second Stern-Gerlach). Naturally, an analogous argument
holds true for any other dot in the second upper or lower Stern-Gerlach
device.
But this so obvious classical reasoning is precisely an example of non-
Bohrian ’which-way’ visualization. Passing the upper or lower half-space in
the first Stern-Gerlach modified device defines the eigen-events Q1 and
Q2 of a physically meaningful observable B (cf (5a)) respectively, which
does not equal a back-evolved form of A . Namely, it is easy to see that
the condition in Theorem 1 is not satisfied: Passing the mentioned upper
half-space does not guarantee that the particle will end up in an upper dot
in the upper second Stern-Gerlach, etc. But [Bf , A] = 0, the condition in
Theorem 2 is, clearly satisfied (spatial degrees of freedom of a particle and its
spin ones always commute). Thus, we have here an example of a ’which-way’
observable that is not equal to any Ar(t) , ti ≤ t < tf .
In this section we have discussed only binary observables, because they
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are simplest and best known. ( One might take a higher-spin particle in the
Stern-Gerlach case and have more than two possibilities.) Naturally, owing
to the simplicity of the cases, a usual Bohrian intuitive discussion is by far
superior in clarity to the expounded formal one. But it was necessary to
illustrate the concepts in the theory of sections 3-7. One should appreciate
that this theory covers the general case.
9 Illustration for the Extended Entities and
Claims
Now we discuss a slightly upgraded version of both the Mach-Zehnder inter-
ference and the Mach-Zehnder which-way devices (cf subsection 8.1).
The primary purpose is to illustrate the relative character of the which-
result or interference property. The secondary purpose is to give an example
for the rest of the entities and claims that are extended with respect to Bohr’s
wave-particle complementarity.
9.1 A Slightly Upgraded Mach-Zehnder Interference
Device
In spite of the interference in the top BS, B (see the caption of the Figure)
is a ’simplest which-way’ observable and the experiment is a which-way one
relative to B in the sense of Section 5. Namely, due to the interference,
there are only two detections (with probability one half each): in the bottom
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Figure 1: In the (slightly upgraded) Mach-Zehnder interference device there
are three beam splitters (BS): the bottom one, the intermediary one, and the
top one; there are two mirrors (M), and three detectors (D): the bottom one,
the upper horizontal one, and the top (vertical) one. If the top beam splitter
is removed, then we have the (slightly upgraded) Mach-Zehnder which-way
device. The photon reaches the bottom beam splitter at the initial moment
ti . It is the preparator as explained in subsection 8.1. For simplicity we
assume that the possible detection in any of the three detectors takes place
at one and the same moment tf . Let ti be the moment when the photon
passes the intermediary beam splitter. Naturally, ti < t0 < tf . There are
two observables: Let the observable B be defined at ti . It has two eigen-
events: Qh , transmission through the bottom BS and propagation towards
the bottom detector, and Qv reflection at the bottom BS and propagation
upwards towards the intermediary BS. The other observable B0 is defined
at t0 . It has three eigen-events: Qlh lower horizontal propagation to-
wards the bottom detector, Quh propagation from the intermediary BS
along the upper horizontal line, and Qv , propagation from the intermedi-
ary BS vertically upwards.
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and in the top detector. If we manipulate the bottom BS as a preparator
(cf subsection 8.1), then one can easily see that the necessary and sufficient
condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied. On account of the simplicity of the
experiment, one can argue also without Theorem 1 as follows.
Let the localization events be Pb in the bottom detector and Pt
in the top one respectively. Since U(tf − ti)†PbU(tf − ti) = Qh , and
U(tf − ti)†PtU(tf − ti) = Qv (the Mach-Zehnder interference device is time-
reversal symmetric), we can attach equal eigenvalues (which are anyway not
important here) to A and B , and obtain B = Ar(ti) . Thus, we are
dealing with a ’simplest which-way’ experiment in relation to B . But ut
is not particle-like behavior in the sense of Bohr because the photon is not
localized all along ti < t < tf ; it exhibits wave-like behavior in the interval
t0 ≤ t < tf .
This discussion gives rigorous justification to the intuitive inference from
the Figure that if the photon ends up in the bottom (top) detector, it had
to come from its transmission through (reflection at) the bottom BS.
The experiment is an interference one with respect to the observable B0
(see the Caption). This is so because of the interference in the top BS.
Let us define the function (coarsening) B′0 of B0 that keeps Qlh
as one of its eigen-events and has
(
Quh + Qv
)
as the (only) other. The
experiment is a which-way one (again in spite of the interference in the top
BS) in relation to B′0 . It is not called ’simplest’ because this observable is
defined at t0 , and not at ti.
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9.2 The Slightly Upgraded Mach-Zehnder Which-Way
Device
Now the observable B is not the ’simplest which-way’ one. Namely, the
condition in Theorem 1 is not satisfied as seen from the fact that Qv does
not lead with certainty to one detector localization.
Incidentally, the Figure and classical intuition would suggest that both
the state of reaching the top detector and that of reaching the upper hor-
izontal one ’come from’ the photon state | φv 〉 corresponding to Qv
( Qv |φv〉 =|φv〉 ). But this is a false conclusion because ’come from’ should
mean quantum-mechanically the application of U(tf − t) . Or equivalently,
|φv〉 should be obtained from the two mentioned final states by application
of U(tf − t)† . But a unitary operator cannot map orthogonal states into
one and the same one.
On the other hand, it is seen that U(tf−ti)QvU(tf−ti)† = Pt+Puh , and
Puh is the event of localization in the upper horizontal detector. Further,
U(tf − ti)QhU(tf − ti)† = Pb . Thus, if we take the function (or coarsen-
ing) f(A) of the measured observable A defined by the right-hand-sides,
which is simultaneously also measured in the measurement of A , then
Bf ≡ U(tf − ti)BU(tf − ti)† = f(A) . Since obviously [f(A), A] = 0 , the
condition in Theorem 2 is satisfied. Therefore, B is a ’simplest which-way’
observable for f(A).
As to B0 , the condition in Theorem 1 makes it obvious that it is a
’simplest which-way’ observable for A . But again it is not so in the sense
of Bohr, because B0 is defined at the moment t0 , and not at the initial
moment.
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10 What is Really Happening?
In an attempt to comprehend what was ’real’ for Bohr, let us read another
quotation from him [26]
Quote BOHR6: ”As a more appropriate way of expression I
advocate the application of the word phenomenon exclusively to
refer to the observations obtained under specified circumstances,
including an account of the whole experimental arrangement.(The
italics are Bohr’s.)
I think that by ”phenomenon” Bohr means a real phenomenon, i. e., that
this is where ’reality’ enters the scene in the view of Bohr.
The retrospective observable Ar(t) in the visualization theory of Sec-
tions 3-7 is primarily a mathematical construction, an ’evolving’ backward
in time of the real observable A . Even when the condition in Theorem
1 is satisfied, and we have the possibility of a visualization in a ’simplest
which-result’ experiment, the eigen-events P rn do not really occur, not even
in the Bohrian sense. They are only imagined or visualized to create a quasi-
classical picture about what is going on within the experiment on hand.
This is particularly clear in Wheeler’s delayed-choice experiments, in
which (both in the two-slit [25] and in the Mach-Zehnder [13] cases) the
choice whether the experiment is going to be the ’which-way’ one or the ’in-
terference’ one is made after the photon has passed the two slits (or the first
beam splitter). Thus, whether the photon is going one way or both ways ap-
pears to be decided backwards in time. Obviously, these are not real events
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happening in nature.
Turning to Bohr’s forbiddance to combine visualizations from comple-
mentary experiments, contained in the complementarity principle, it seems
a justified warning that should save us from taking the visualizations too
seriously, i. e., as if they were real occurrences in nature, and thus differ-
ent aspects of reality that should be combined into a complete picture. In
quantum-mechanical insight all aspects are present simultaneously. If one
overemphasizes and even falsifies two distinct aspects (the wave-like and the
particle-like one in Bohr’s approach), it is natural that they become incom-
patible.
11 Assessment
A good deal of physical evaluation of wave-particle complementarity in the
Bohrian way was accomplished during the critical derivation in sections 3-7
because it was done purposely pointing out the arbitrary or imaginary steps.
Now I’ll pay additional attention only to the (most important) case of
’simplest interference-which result’ experiment, in particular when Ar(ti)
is physically meaningful.
Let me discuss the first illusion (the first drastic imagined step of
changes, cf Section 5, second passage). As far as the experiment is con-
cerned, the initial state ρ(ti) can be replaced by the butchered mixture
with respect to the ’back-evolved’ observable Ar(ti) (cf (8a)). But, if there
is coherence (cf Definition 1), then the ’which-result’ visualization in case
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the individual experiment gives one of these results, grossly violates the co-
herence, which, from the point of view of the ’reality-of-state’ approach, to
which this author adheres, is a serious falsification of reality.
Thus, in case of the Mach-Zehnder which-way device (cf Subsection 8.1)
with a coherent initial state (cf (13a)), the Bohrian particle-like aspect creates
the illusion that the photon takes one of the paths. This violates grossly the
coherence.
John Bell had apparently strong feelings about this as it is clear from his
term ”butchered” state vector for ρM(ti) [18].
Let me turn to the second illusion (the second drastic imagined step
of changes). Classically, interpretation of ρ(ti)M as a simple mixture
would mean that there is, e. g., a subensemble ρ(ti)
n
M in it which has
the sharp value in question, and the individual quantum system belongs to
this subensemble. Then, at first glance, the ’which-result visualization’ might
appear to correspond to reality.
This argument may stem from a Bohrian devotedness to classical physics.
From the point of view of the ’reality-of-state’ approach, this is an unaccept-
able prejudice. Namely, as well known, even if the density operator has no
more than a two-dimensional range, there are infinitely many decompositions
into density operators, i. e., it can be written in that many ways as a mix-
ture. Quantum-mechanically none of them has a privileged role, which would
enable one interpret it as the real state of affairs (as far as decomposition of
ensemble into individual-system states is concerned).
Neither this point has escaped Bell’s attention as seen from his words
[27]:
Quote BELL2: ”The idea that elimination of coherence, in one
way or another, implies the replacement of ’and’ by ’or’ is a very
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common one among solvers of the ’measurement problem’. It has
always puzzled me.”
Thus, the Bohrian approach in terms of complementary particle-like and
wave-like experiments does not reveal two, mutually exclusive, aspects of
the state ρ(ti) . It gives a completely distorted view. It has very little
to do with reality. (Though, it does give a simplified semi-classical un-
derstanding of what is going on in the experiment in partial agreement with
quantum mechanics.)
As to merits of the present study (if any), I would like to quote Fagundes
[28]:
Quote FAGUNDES: ”... physics progresses by increasing de-
grees of abstraction. This is only natural since ’concrete’ ideas
are just those of our too limited ordinary sense experience.”
I think, these words are applicable, to some extent, also to the slight
progress achieved by deriving a sharp and extended form of ’interference-
which-result’ complementarity from quantum mechanics in this article.
12 Concluding Remarks
The derivation in sections 3-7 follows Bohr’s endeavor to envelop the un-
derstanding of a quantum experiment in classical physics as in a chocolate
coating. This is not surprising when one takes into account what a low opin-
ion Bohr had of the quantum formalism. I’ll give two excerpts to illustrate
this claim. The first is from Saunders [29].
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Quote SAUNDERS: ”The quantum formalism is only an ab-
stract calculus. As we have seen, Bohr made this point over and
over again.” (Italics by Saunders)
On Bohr’s suspicion about the quantum formalism we have similar words
by Heisenberg [30]
Quote HEISENBERG: ”I noticed that mathematical clarity
had in itself no virtue for Bohr. He feared that the formal math-
ematical structure would obscure the physical core of the prob-
lem,...”
Reichenbach [16] made a variation on Bohr’s idea of visualization by in-
troducing ’interphenomena’.
Fagundes [28], probably laboring under the burden of lack of sufficient
reality in both Bohr’s and Reichenbach’s concepts, suggested to replace vi-
sualization by literally nothing. (A consistently positivistic point of view, so
it appears.)
Holladay’s ”which-value-interference complementarity” approach [31] is
closest to mine. (I was even influenced by his terminology.)
I am certain that there are other praiseworthy related endeavors that
have escaped my attention.
Murdoch, in his detailed study of Bohr [32], writes (beginning of p. 68):
Quote MURDOCH1: ”Bohr came to hold that the wave and
particle models are equally necessary for a complete description
of the real nature of micro-physical entities - the symmetry thesis,
as I shall call it.”
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Later on (in the second passage of p. 79) he writes:
Quote MURDOCH2: ”The symmetry thesis, then, is difficult
to sustain, and with it the thesis of wave-particle complementar-
ity. The thesis has lost the palliative value it once had, and has
now merely a historical significance.” (Emphasis by F. H..)
The present study confirms this dismissal of Bohr’s complementarity prin-
ciple on part of Murdoch (who, as it seems, has studied Bohr thoroughly).
Present-day research on the foundations of quantum mechanics
does not need palliation. Its aim is to understand quantum reality
as it is.
Finally, I would like to point out that Bohr and the Copenhagen inter-
pretation [33] caused a substantial delay in the historical development of the
foundations of quantum mechanics. Bohr’s own words [34] bear witness to
this claim.
Quote BOHR7: ”There is no quantum world. There is only an
abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that
the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns
what we can say about nature.”
By now it must be obvious to the reader that the author’s attitude in the
analysis in this article is a rebelion against this view of Bohr. The reality-
of-state approach, to which the author is partial, stipulates precisely the
opposite: however abstract, we must take the quantum-mechanical
description of experiments seriously because it reveals how nature
is. And no lesser goal is worthy of our efforts. We should be able to
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”say about nature” how it really is though only in an approximation that
should be as good as possible.
I think that Gell-Mann gave an impressive criticism of Bohr [35]:
Quote GELL-MANN: ”The fact that an adequate philosoph-
ical presentation has been so long delayed is no doubt caused
by the fact that Niels Bohr brainwashed a whole generation of
theorists into thinking that the job was done fifty years ago”
Landsman says [36] (p. 214) ”Beller [37] went further than any critic be-
fore or after her by portraying Bohr not as the Gandhi of 20th century physics
(as in Pais, 1991 [38]), but rather as its Stalin, a philosophical dilettante who
knew no mathematics and hardly even followed the physics of his day, but
who nonetheless managed to stifle all opposition by a combination of political
manoeuvring, shrewd rhetoric, and spellbinding both his colleagues and the
general audience by the allegedly unfathomable depth of his thoughts (which,
according to Beller, were actually incoherent and inconsistent)” (italics by
F. H.).
Landsman then comments as follows: ”Despite Beller’s meticulous and
passionate arguments, we do not actually believe Bohr’s philosophy of quan-
tum mechanics was such a great muddle after all.”
Let me point out, at the end, that in spite of the mentioned delay, it seems
to me that Bohr has done mankind an invaluable service by saving it from be-
ing hopelessly lost in a labyrinth searching for objective quantum mechanics
at an early stage. Thus, he made possible the unparalleled swift development
of quantum mechanics in atomic, molecular, solid-state etc. physics, i. e.,
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a rapid and immense progress of quantum mechanics as a practical science
and no less of quantum technology.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof Necessity If the retrospective observable Ar(t) has a physical
meaning, then one can take B(t) ≡ Ar(t), and the bijection is the identity
map. The required property obviously holds.
Sufficiency Let B(t) =
∑
k bkQk(t) be an observable with physical
meaning, and let {| φ(t)〉k,lk : ∀k, ∀lk} be a complete orthonormal eigen-
basis of B(t) satisfying
∀k : ∑
lk
|φ(t)〉k,lk〈φ(t) |k,lk= Qk(t). (A.1)
This makes the vectors |φ(t)〉k,lk eigen-vectors of B(t) corresponding to
the eigenvalues bk , and the index lk enumerates the multiplicity (possible
degeneracy) of the eigenvalue bk of B .
Further, one can define
∀k, lk : |ψ(tf )〉k,lk ≡ U(tf − t) |φ(t)〉k,lk . (A.2)
On account of the unitarity of U(tf − t) , also the basis {| ψ(tf )〉k,lk :
∀k,∀lk} is orthonormal and complete.
Relations (A.1) imply that each state | φ(t) 〉k,lk has the property
Qk(t), and, since we assume validity of the condition in Theorem 1, the re-
sult of the measurement of A in the corresponding final state |ψ(tf )〉k,lk
is certainly an(k), i. e.,
∀k, lk : tr(Pn(k) |ψ〉k,lk〈ψ |k,lk) = 1.
37
We can rewrite this as
∀k, lk :
(
〈ψ |k,lk Pn(k)
)(
Pn(k) |ψ〉k,lk
)
= 1,
implying
∀k, lk :
(
〈ψ |k,lk P⊥n(k)
)(
P⊥n(k) |ψ〉k,lk
)
= 0,
where P⊥n(k) ≡ I − Pn(k), I being the identity operator. Further, one
obtains P⊥n(k) |ψ〉k,lk = 0 (due to positive definiteness of the norm), and
∀k, lk : Pn(k) |ψ〉k,lk =|ψ〉k,lk ,
implying
∀k, lk : Pn(k) |ψ〉k,lk〈ψ |k,lk=|ψ〉k,lk〈ψ |k,lk .
Summing out lk for each value of k, and utilizing (A.2) and (A.1), one
obtains
∀k : Pn(k)
(
U(tf − t)Qk(t)U(tf − t)†
)
= U(tf − t)Qk(t)U(tf − t)†. (A.3)
On the other hand, we have, in view of (5b) and (A.3),
∀k : Pn(k) = Pn(k)I = Pn(k)
[∑
k′
(
U(tf − t)Qk′(t)U(tf − t)†)
)]
=
Pn(k)
[∑
k′
(
Pn(k′)U(tf−t)Qk′(t)U(tf−t)†)
)]
= Pn(k)
(
U(tf−t)Qk(t)U(tf−t)†
)
.
(A.4)
Relations (A.3) and (A.4) imply
∀k : U(tf − t)Qk(t)U(tf − t)† = Pn(k),
which is equivalent to
∀k : Qk(t) = P rn(k)(t)
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(cf (4b)). Hence, B(t) = Ar(t). 2
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
First we prove a lemma.
A.Lemma The commutation condition (12) is equivalent to
∀(k 6= k′), ∀n : QfkPnQfk′ = 0. (B.1)
Proof On account of the well-known fact that two Hermitian operators with
purely discrete spectra commute if and only if each eigen-projector of one
commutes with each eigen-projector of the other, (12) implies (B.1). Con-
versely, utilizing the completeness relation (5b), which is obviously valid
mutatis mutandis for the spectral eigen-projectors of Bf , one can see that
if (B.1) is valid, then
∀k, n : QfkPn = QfkPnI =
∑
k′
QfkPnQ
f
k′ = Q
f
kPnQ
f
k .
Adjoining this, one obtains
∀k, n : PnQfk = QfkPnQfk .
These two relations imply (12). 2
Proof of Theorem 2 Sufficiency of (12) for ’which-result’ behavior. Straight-
forward calculation shows that, owing to (12), A.Lemma, and (B.1),
∀n : tr
(
ρ(tf )Pn
)
= tr
(
Iρ(tf )IPn
)
=
39
∑
k
∑
k′
tr
(
Qfkρ(tf )Q
f
k′Pn
)
=
∑
k
∑
k′
tr
(
ρ(tf )Q
f
k′PnQ
f
k
)
=
∑
k
tr
(
Qfkρ(tf )Q
f
kPn
)
= tr
(
ρ(tf )M,BPn
)
.
Necessity of (12) for ’which-result’ behavior and proof of claim B). Now
we argue that if (12) is not valid, then B is an ’interference’ observable. (In
this way we prove both that which-result behavior implies (12), and claim
B).)
Let (12) not be valid. Then ∃k, n, k′ such that QfkPnQfk′ 6= 0 (cf
A.Lemma). Let, further,
Qfk ≡
∑
lk
| lk〉〈lk |, (B.2a)
and
Qfk′ ≡
∑
lk′
| lk′〉〈lk′ | (B.2b)
be projector decompositions into ray projectors (in terms of basis vectors
defined by (B.2a) and (B.2b), though incompletely in general). Substitution
of (B.2a) and (B.2b) in the inequality leads to
∑
lk
∑
lk′ |lk〉〈lk | Pn |lk′〉〈lk′ |6=
0. Hence, there must exist special values lk and lk′ such that
〈lk | Pn | lk′〉 6= 0. (B.3)
Let
| lk, ti〉 ≡ U(tf − ti)† | lk〉, | lk′ , ti〉 ≡ U(tf − ti)† | lk′〉. (B.4)
Finally, let α, β be non-zero complex numbers such that |α|2 + |β|2 =
1 . We define the initial state
ρ(ti) ≡
(
α | lk, ti〉+ β | lk′ , ti〉
)(
α ∗ 〈lk, ti | +β ∗ 〈lk′,ti |
)
,
where the asterisk denotes complex conjugation. Then the final state is
ρ(tf ) =
(
α | lk〉+ β | lk′〉
)(
α∗〈lk | +β∗〈lk′ |
)
.
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As to the ’unbutchered’ and the ’butchered’ states, (B.2a) and (B.2b) imply,
as easily seen,
tr
(
ρ(tf )Pn
)
= tr
(
Iρ(tf )IPn
)
=∑
k′′
tr
(
Qfk′′ρ(tf )Q
f
k′′Pn
)
+
∑
k′′ 6=k′′′
tr
(
Qfk′′ρ(tf )Q
f
k′′′Pn
)
=
tr
(
ρ(tf )M,BPn
)
+ αβ ∗ 〈lk′ | Pn | lk〉+ βα ∗ 〈lk | Pn | lk′〉.
It follows from (B.3) that this is different than tr
(
ρ(tf )M,BPn
)
, i. e., the
experiment distinguishes the the ’unbutchered’ and the ’butchered’ states.
Since B(t) and Bf are by assumption physically meaningful, so are, in
principle, also the eigen-states | lk〉 and | lk′〉 of Bf . 2
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